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In marked contrast to the first half of the twentieth century 
when there is no evidence of sustained per capita growth in China, 
since the Cormnunist Party rose to nower in 1949 per capita output has 
accelerated rapidly. Excluding the period of rapid recovery from 
war and civil war setbacks ,which was largely complete by the end of 
1952, per capita output (measured in constant prices) tripled between 
1952 and the late 1970s. Although aggregate output accelerated, agri­
cultural performance was only marginally better than it had been in 
1
the six centuries before the Communist Party came to power. Farm out­
put rose by less than one-half of one percent per year per capita up 
to the late 1970s. Industrial output, by contrast, grew in excess of 
2 
eleven percent annually, nine percent in per capita terms. This paper 
sketches out an explanation of the unusual disparity i~ the sectoral 
rates of growth up to the late 1970s and ventures a preliminary judg­
ment on whether the change in economic policy regime instituted since 
1978 can be expected to alter the historic patterns of growth. 
Agriculture in Historical Perspective 
In his remarkable study, Agricultural Development in China 1368-1968, Dwight 
Perkins explains how Chinese agriculture supported, at what appears to be 
a constant level of per capita output, a population that grew from 65-80 
million at the beginning of the Ming Dynasty in 1368 to 540 million by 
the middle of the twentieth century. His careful empirical research 
suggests that only about half of that population increase was supported 
by simply expanding' sown area within an otherwise unchanging agriculture. 
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Although agriculture was still traditional by the usual criteria that 
farmers' knowledge about factors they used had not changed in generations 
3
and net'per capita savings was quite low, Chinese agriculture had be-
come increasingly complex and sophisticated. 
Increased sophistication of Chinese agriculture was evident pri­
marily in the evolution of cropping and marketing patterns rather than 
changes in mechanical technology. 4 The 100st well-known cropping 
pattern changeswa-e stimulated by the introduction of early ripening 
rice varieties from central Indo-China during the Sung Dynasty (960-
1126).5 Initially planted in limited areas in the southeast, within 
two centuries these varieties were grown widely in Chekiang, southern 
Kiangsu, and Kiangsi and by the Ming Dynasty they had diffused to 
large parts of the southwest and to central China, especially the 
present-day provinces of Hupeh and Hunan. Diffusion of early ripening 
varieties contributed to increased grain output for two reasons. First, 
their shorter growing season allowed the spread of multiple cropping 
from south to central China. Second, because their water require~nts 
were less than those of the traditional rice varieties, early ripening 
varieties allowed the spread of rice cultivation to higher lands where 
water supplies were previously insufficient to support rice cultivation. 
The introduction of new food crops such as corn, peanuts, Irish 
potatoes as well as tobacco, cotton, and other non-food crops also 
contributed to agricultural growth and changes in patterns of regional 
settlement. Peanuts, for example, could be grown in poorer quality soils so 
became particularly important crops in sandy areas of the lower Yellow 
River and in poorer,JIIOuntainous districts. In brief, the cultivation 
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of new crops was not distributed randomly across the Chinese agrarian 
landscaoe. Rather innovative Chinese peasants tended to adoot the 
cultivation of these crops in regions of comparative advantage. 
That process of increasing specialization, which contributed 
importantly to growing productivity per unit of land, was dependent on 
increased marketing, not only locally but interregionally as well. 
During the transitional period from mid-T'ang to Sung the subsistence 
basis of the rural economy was replaced by. an increasingly complex 
marketing with interregiona1 kets. The development of inter-
marketing system. Over an ever-broadening area some periodic market 
sites developed into marketing towns, linking intra-rural 
6 . . . mar 
regional markets in rice and other staple commodities began as early 
as the T'ang Dynasty (618-906) and accelerated in the twelfth and 
thirteenth centuries as increased cultivation of sugarcane and other 
cash crops on the southeast coast was facilitated by rice and other 
staoles shipped from surplus regions in the Yangtse Delta, the Canton 
Delta, and the central Kan River Valley. 
7 Even prior to the Ming it 
appears that the great southward migration of population had led to 
pooulation densities on the southeast coast far in excess of what could 
have been supported on the basis of rice cultivation alone. The 
population density was sustained on the basis of cash crops that were 
traded for rice from surplus grain regions. 
Although the regions of surplus cereal production shifted over 
time, interregional trade increa.sed. By the first half of the 17th 
century the lower Yangtse region itself had become a grain-deficit 
region because of ~creased allocation of land to the production of 
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noncereal crops and a rising rate of urbanization. The lower Yangtse 
had come to depend on rice supplied from Kiangsi, Anhui, and especially 
present-day Hunan and Hupei where rice production had increased sub­
stantially because of the introduction of early ripening varieties. 
8discussed above. 
In the late seventeenth century Hunan and Hupeh had become the 
bread basket of the Chinese empire. Their rice surpluses flowed down 
the Yangtse River to suoplv cereal-deficit regions in the lower Yangtse. 
Part of that supply moved north to the Ch'ing capital at Peking via the 
Grand Canal. Hunan also shipped somewhat smaller quantities to the 
southeast coastal provinces of Fukien and Kwangtun2 and to western 
regions such as Shensi and possibly to Kweichow in the southwest. Chuan 
and Kraus estimate that at mid-Ch'ing Hunan-Hupeh exports totalled 
9from 500,000 to 750,000 metric tons. 
Another major example of interregional trade was the grain-cotton 
trade between north and central China. By the seventeenth and eighteenbh 
centuries textile production in the lower Yangtse was dependent on- raw 
10rnrt-nn prorh1ren in ~h,mtnng,. Hon;in smd p1"~i:::~nf"-d,:iy Hopei= These 
regions in north China, in turn, depended for part ai their food con­
sumption· on cereals originating in the middle Yangtse region that flowed 
down river and then were shipped north via the Grand Canal or coastal 
routes from the lower Yangtse. Thus a triangular trade based on 
relatively inexpensive water transport emerged, facilitating productivity 
growth. The expansion of specialized production based on comparative 
advantage and interregional trade in agricultural products was stimulated 
further by railroad'development after 1895, particularly in north and 
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northeast China where water transport was limited. 
Thus while production technology changed little between the four­
teenth and early twentieth centuries> Chinese peasants responded 
positively to new opportunities that arose from the availability of 
improved seed varieties, new crops, improved transport systems, and 
rising urban demand. In most respects peasant behavior appears con­
sistent with the view advanced by T. w. Schultz and others that 
peasants respond efficiently to new production and marketing oppor­
tunities.11 For reasons that are not well understood, however, the 
increased physical productivity of Chinese farming and absorption of 
new crops did not lead to a growth of incomes, "on the contrary, 
12
growth was all demographic." Thus by the mid-twentieth century 
arable land per agricultural worker was only six-tenths of a hectare, 
substantiallv less than the levels in o.ther developing countries in 
- - ~d_ 
East Asia> Southeast Asia and South Asia,/of course, much less than 
12a 
at the onset of modern economic growth in Japan or Western Europe. 
Development Policy Since 1949 
While population growth increased and arable land actuallv shrank 
after 1949, the thesis of this paper is that persistent undervaluation 
of agriculture by the Chinese Communist Party contributed significantly 
to the relatively slow growth of agriculture after 1949. Undervaluation 
of agriculture is reflected in policies that, on balance, have reduced 
peasant income earning ooportunities~ inhibited efficient resource 
allocation within agriculture , and depressed agricultural investment. 
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Price and Marketing Arrangements 
Und~rvaluation of agriculture initially was reflected in the system 
of producer levies introduced in the fall of 1953. Prior to that time 
the state sought to satisfy the growing demands for agricultural raw 
material by state manufacturing establishme~ts by purchasing commodities 
on rural periodic markets. State influence on the production decisions 
of peasants was indirect and depended on peasant responsiveness to 
changes in relative prices. Meeting demands for agricultural raw 
materials and increasingly for urban consumption, however, was increasingly 
expensive since the terms of trade between the state and peasantry 
were turning in favor of the peasantry. Because of the increased 
demand on state resources as the First Five Year Plan was getting under 
way, a system of compulsory levies at fixed prices was introduced in 
the fall of 1953. 
In theory the average price received by peasants in a system 
combining forced deliveries to the government at low prices and an un­
restricted market for the remainder of peasant surpluses need not be 
less than the price that would be received on a single free market 
13with no government intervention. The average price received under 
a system with quota deliveries is simply the weighted average of the 
price received for sales to the state and the price on the open market for the 
residual of peasant marketings. In the short run, if the government 
separates the urban market for grain into high and low income consumers 
and supplies the grain purchased at below market prices to low income 
urbanites, while the urban rich compete for the reduced supply on an 
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open market, the average price received by producers will be higher than 
under a free market with no government intervention. This result 
depends"onlv o_n the (absolute) price elasticity of demand of the urban 
rich being less than that of the urban poor. 
14 This rationale has 
been advanced in favor of the Indian system of producer levies. Its 
attraction is the ability to use the price mechanism to transfer.income 
from the urban rich to urban poor, and perhaps even to the peasantry, 
without imposing a negative incentive effect on producers. 
In practice, the conditions necessary for this happy outcome have 
15 
never been fulfilled in China. Most critical, the Chinese coupon 
rationing system for cereals and edible vegetable oils as early as 
1955 was extended to encompass the entire urban population and the 
amounts supplied were sufficiently generous that the volume of inter­
sectoral sales by peasants at uncontrolled prices was reduced sub­
stantially. Moreover, prior to the imposition of the producer levy 
svstem,the state converted traditional grain markets in cities and in 
market towns to state grain markets, where prices were subject to 
~r~rP rnntrol_ The only remaining outlet for cereals were smaller 
informal markets within the countryside. But even here sales were 
limited in volume and private millers could no longer purchase grain 
in these markets for ultimate resale to market town or city dwellers. 
Private traders and processers came under the administrative jurisdiction 
of the Ministry of Food and its local agencies. All of these ·re­
strictions were necessary to ensure that grain taxes, paid in kind, 
and quota delivery targets were fulfilled. Consequently. the magnitude 
of grain transactiops in rural markets was curtailed substantially, from 
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about seven to eight million metric tons in the early 1950s to two to 
three million metric tons by 1954-55. Restrictions on cotton which 
was alse subject to delivery quotas were more severe. Private sale 
of raw cotton was prohibited and the sale of handicraft yam spun or 
cloth woven by cotton growers was also prohibited. 
In the decades following the imposition of producer levies at fixed 
prices rural markets have been liberalized in three periods; from the 
middle of 1956 through the fall of 1957, from 1961 or 1962 through 1965, 
and since 1979. In the first two of these periods the emergence of 
the opportunity to sell products privately either undermined or raised 
the cost to the government's system of producer levies and the scope 
was 
of the markets subsequently/curtailed. Thus for most of the years since 1953 
government procurement policy has tende~ to depress the average price received 
by farmers below the price that would prevail in the absence of government interven 
tion, reducing proc;luction in,centives. Moreo"V"er, the curtailment of local market­
ing not only reduced the prices peasants received, but reduced their opportunities 
to earn income from the sale of counnodities not subject to state producer levies. 
Comparative Advantage, Interregional Trade, and Produc_d.vity Growth 
While constraints on local marketing imposed efficiency 
losses because of the inhibition of specialization within local market­
ing regions, curtailment of interregional trade was far more serious 
since it interrupted the patterns of regional specialization based on 
comparative advantage that were such an important source of production 
growth during the Ming and Ch'ing dynasties. The suppression of inter-
not 
regional trade was.lmuch in evidence prior to the Great Leap Forward. 
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Indeed during the early 1950s and con-
tinuing through the First Plan (1952-1957) state 
policy'facilitated trade and specialization. The interprovincial 
flow of cereal crops recovered rapidly in the early 1950s, reaching a 
peak of 7.85 million metric tons in 1953, about 5.5 percent of cereal 
. 16 production. Interprovincial flows were only slightly less than this 
for the four-year average 1953-56. 
While a portion of these flows actually went to feed the two 
largest cities, Peking and Shanghai, which had provincial level 
administrative status, a significant share supported patterns of 
comparative advantage cropping that had evolved over previous cen­
turies.17 A detailed analysis of the regional distribution of cropping 
of cotton, China's most important non-food crop, for example, shows 
that its production was concentrated in traditional cotton-growing 
regions of the Norbli China Plain. Among all Chinese provinces Hopei 
had·the strongest comparative advantage in cotton production (as 
measured by the yield of cotton relative to cereal crops) and the 
highest share of land sown to cotton (8.5 percent). Moreover 80 per­
cent of cotton production was concentrated in the southern and central 
portions of the province. In the eight major producing counties cotton 
sown area on average absorbed a third of total sown area and in ohe 
county, Ch'engan, reached a peak of 51 percent. During those years 
40 percent of the cotton produced in the region was shipped to other 
provinces or to Shanghai, China's traditional textile center. Because 
of its concentration in comparative advantage crops such as cotton, and 
to a lesser extent.peanuts and sesame, the province was the single largest 
-J.v-
importer of cereals during the First Plan. The state supplied on 
average over a million tons of foodgralns per year, slightly over 10 
percent,of provincial production. 
Cotton was not unique; interregional trade facilitatEdspecialized 
production of soybeans, other oilseed crops, sugarcane, sugar beet, etc. 
Nor was specialization necessarily limited to the Yani;i;tse River region 
regions · water or 
or cotton producing/on the North China Plain where/rail transport 
facilitated low cost movement of bulky crops. Even more remote regions 
sometimes specialized in high value crops. In mountainous southern 
Yunnan Province, on the border with Laos and Burma, grain production 
in the Hsishuangpana Thai Autonomous Chou historically was never 
sufficient to meet consumption needs. In the 1950s, prior to the 
emergence of local self-sufficiency as a policy, this area continued 
its historic specialization in production of high value noncereal 
crops such as tea, shellac, tropical fruits, and medicinal herbs which 
they traded for 70 percent of their food requirements. In remote 
mountainous northwest Hunan a single prefecture prior to liberatjon 
produced one-fifth of China's tung oil. In the 1950s tung oil, tea 
oil, timber, medicinal herbs, and forestry products were the basis of 
the local economy and were traded for rice produced in the alluvial 
regions of Hunan, especially around Tungt':ing Lake. 
Although its origins are not well understood, local self-sufficiency 
in cereals became an important policy objective during the Greap Leap 
Forward. The communes formed at that time were to become largely self­
contained local communities each with their own small-scale industries, 
food processing plants, and social service system. Provincial Party 
,, , 
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secretaries on the North China Plain, such as Wu Chih-p'u in Honan, 
sought to demonstrate the success of the Great Leap locally by pro­
18claiming that they had become self-sufficient in cereals. Policies 
of self-sufficiency were abandoned in the first half of the 1960s as 
economic policy formulation increasingly was influenced by Ch'en YUn, 
the highest ranking Party economic specialist. In the 1950s Ch'en had 
promoted more favorable price and marketing policies, but he was 
19pushed aside by Mao Tsetung when the Great Leap Forward got underway. 
However, interregional trade never recovered to the level of the 
1950s and, after the onset of the Cultural Revolution in 1966, trade 
shrank further. In 1965 interprovincial cereal exports were 4.7 
million-metric tons or 2.8 percent of production. That presumably 
was up from a trough in 1960-61,but data for those years are not 
available. By 1978,after a decade of emphasis on cereal production 
and self-sufficiency, interprovincial exports had shrunk to 2.05 
million tons or less than one percent of output. And of this flow 1.68 
million tons was destined for international markets. 20 Thus internal 
trade of domestically produced cereals had shrunk to a few hundred 
thousand tons, less than one-tenth of one percent of domestic production. 
In Hunan province, for example, with a population of about 50 million 
where per capita grain production (80 percent rice) in 1978 was 84 
kilograms or more than 25 percent in excess of the national average, 
rice exports were only 500,000 tons, less than three percent of production, 
and probably less, in absolute term~ than they were two and one-half centuries 
earlier. Rice exports of other provinces, where the widespread adoption of high 
yielding short-staik rice varieties had contributed to rapid growth of 
21output and high levels of per capita production were similarly low. 
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Suppression of interregional marketing by the government appears 
to have substantially reduced the efficiency of farm production. The 
reduction or loss of external sources of cereals led to less efficient 
production in regions that historically tended to specialize in non­
grain crops that they traded for cereals. Traditional cereal producers, 
in response to reduced supplies of nongrain crops from external sources, 
sought to increase their own production of sugar and other crops, 
although the opportunity cost in terms of lost cereal production was 
considerable. Increased inefficiency is reflected in western 
estimatesof declining total factor productivity between 1965 and the 
late 1970s and in a sharp rise in the cost of purchased inputs as a 
22share of the gross value of output. 
Although one cannot separate out the effects of reduced inter­
regional trade from egalitarian distribution policies within 
individual producing units that may have diminished X-efficiency, the 
significance of reduced interregional trade is suggested by examining 
a few individual localities. 
In northwest Hunan by 1979 there were 915 poverty stricken pro­
duction teams, where per capita incomes were less than forty yuan per 
capita annually, the monetary value of the nationally established 
poverty line in rural areas. 23As external supplies of grain had been 
curtailed the region had been forced to pursue cereal self-sufficiency, 
largely through slash and burn methods that destroyed the traditional 
basis of their livelihood, tung oil and other forestry products. 
In the 1950s Fukien province on the southeast coast of China was 
a major sugar producer and exporter, continuing a pattern that had been , , , 
-13-
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evident since the twelfth century. Since sugar is a minor food item, 
the share of land devoted to its cultivation was low for the province 
as a whole (about one percent of sown area) but production was con­
centrated in a few densely populated counties in Chinchiang Prefecture 
where as much as twenty percent of the land was devoted to sugarcane 
cultivation. This region of Fukien continued to depend on external 
grain supplies in the 1950s as it had for centuries. Production fell 
because of the crisis brought on by the Great Leap Forward, but had 
fully recovered by 1965 in the wake of the more favorable price and 
market policies adopted in the early 1960s. Just before the onset of 
the Cultural Revolut•ion Fukien shipped 100,000 tons of refined sugar, 
over half of total production. 
By 1976 sugar yields, production, and export had all fallen 
sharply. Exports, for example, fell to 22,000 tons, a fifth the level 
of 1966. Naturally as trade opportunities were reduced peasant income 
and consumption fell sharply. 
the most important sugarcane producer in Fukien, 
In Hsienyu County/by 1976 per capita cereal consumotion averaged, -
only 145 kilograms (unprocessed) per capita, well below the 200 kilogram 
level that constitutes the official poverty standard in south China. 
The depression of farm income and consumption through the curtailment 
of long-established trade patterns is not surprising. The dense 
population on the southeast coast could only be sustained on the basis 
of specialized production of high value crops such as sugarcane arid i. 
fruits. Arable land in Hsienyu in the late 1970s was extremely limited, 
.03 hectares per capita, about two-thirds less than the national average. 
Although rice yields in the region were among the highest in all of 
25 
-14-
China, trade curtailment reduced the region to abject poverty. 
The high cost of trade restriction is confirmed by developments 
in more recent years. Only four years after the central government 
guaranteed the availability of cereals for sale to cane producers, cane 
sown area increased two-thirds, yields more than doubled, refined 
sugar output more than tripled, and shipments of refined sugar out 
of the province rose over seven-fold. Income of peasants in sugarcane 
producing regions roughly doubled. Moreover 
this transformation was achieved solely through restoration of market­
ing opportunities. 1n peasant transactions with the state there was 
no change in the ratio of the price producers paid for grain and the 
price they received for sugarcane. 
State Investment and Credit Policy 
Undervaluation of agriculture by the state is also reflected in 
. 26 
state investment and credit policy. For the years 1953 through 1978 
the state allocated 12 percent of state investment to agriculture, 
60 percent to industry. Since agriculture in 1952 was the sector of 
origin of over three times as large as share of the - economy as was 
industry, the disproportion is even larger if the investment magnitudes 
are expressed in terms of rates of reinvestment within each sector. 
Naturally a complete analysis of the sectoral allocation of investment 
requires an analysis of the flows of credit from the state banking 
system and the internal reinvestment of collective farm units and of 
state industrial enterprises. The main points that emerge from that 
analysis are as follows. First, on balance the Chinese have pursued a 
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classic Stalinist industrialization strategy. Credit supplied by the 
state banking system to collective agriculture has been quite modest. 
Moreover, internal reinvestment in agriculture by collective units 
in the aggregate has been quite small, averaging for example six to 
seven percent of value added in agriculture in 1977 and 1978. On the 
other hand internal reinvestment of retained earnings by enterprises 
are quite large,especially after 1966. But for complex bureaucratic 
reasons these data are not reflected in state investment allocation 
data. Thus the 1: 5 ratio of investment shares may understate the 
real tilt toward industry. However, policy has not been uniformly 
imbalanced in favor of industrial growth. Up to 1957 and again since 
1978 state credit flows to agriculture have been significant. Internal 
reinvestment by farmers up through 1957 also was somewhat greater, about 
10 percent of value added in agriculture. At least in part higher 
rates of reinvestmnet in bhis period were possible because farmers 
were not yet encumbered with a flow of high-priced agricultural pro­
ducer goods such as chemical fertilizers and machinery. After 1966 
intern:::il reinvestment w:::is held do'!JTI heC'.:::111se declining prnd11C'.t-ivity 
growth and the growing burden of overpriced modern inputs reduced the 
growth of net revenues of collective units. Simultaneously state 
credit and investment flows were reduced, the former in absolute and 
the latter in proportionate terms. 
The niggardly flow of resources to agriculture from tihe state and 
the high degree of taxation embedded in the price structure governing 
peasant-state transactions is reflected in the very modest stock of 
assets in collective agriculture. Fixed assets (excluding land) per 
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agricultural laborer in 1977-78 averaged only 275 yuan, less than a 
tenth the level in industry. The model communes to which western 
visitors are taken invariably have innumberable tractors, pumps, and 
a vast array of other types of farm machinery and equipment. But the 
total fixed assets of the average team" which in 1977-78 had 60 workers 
and 20 hectares of cultivated land, were less than 17,000 yuan. At 
the farm level prices prevailing in the late 1970s total physical produc­
tive farming assets per team would be a single large tractor or three 
walking tractors. 
Summary 
The inability of agriculture after 1949 to improve upon its his­
toric pattern of simply matching the rate of growth of population seems 
paradoxical. During the first three decades of Communist rule there 
were important improvements in irrigation systems, the early development 
and wide diffusion of high yielding rice varieties, the developme~t 
of a large modern chemical fertilizer industry, and major improvements 
in transportation systems:, particularly roads and railroads. The 
pace of these developments should have been conducive to 
agricultural output growth in excess of demographic growth but that 
did not, in fact, occur. 
Instead what emerged was a classic pattern of imbalanced growth, 
whether measured in output trends, discussed at the outset of this paper 
or in terms of investment shares, discussed in the last section. Not 
only did industrial growth accelerate while agriculture stagnated:, most 
industrial growth was concentrated in heavy industry. Coal" steel, and 
-17-
electric power output soared while per capita cotton cloth consumption 
by 1978 was significantly lower than two decades earlier. In short, 
Chinese agriculture proved far too complex to thrive in an economic 
system in which the state systematically interferred with local markets, 
reduced interregional flows of agricultural connnodities, and suppressed 
farm prices. 
Development Policy Since the End of the Cultural Revolution 
In many respects 1977-1978 appears to mark a major watershed in 
Chinese agricultural development policy. All of the factors retarding 
growth in the past now have been modified. State purchase prices for 
farm products on average rose more than 40 percent between 1977 and 1981 
and the state bank substantially increased the flow of credit to agri­
culture. Rural markets were reopened widely by 1979 and sale of grain 
and edible vegetable oils by producers is legal, after government 
delivery quotas are filled. The state also has sought to guarantee 
the sale of adequate supplies of cereals to producers of cotton, sugar­
cane, and some other economic crops, when necessary through interregional 
grain transfers. 
These policy changes have led to a remarkable acceleration of 
agricultural growth. Between 1977 and 1981 cotton output rose 45 
percent; sugarcane, 70 percent; sugar beet, 160 percent; oil seed crops, 
155 percent; meat, 62 percent. 1 e part of tis growth
27 Wh·l h. o f output 
of noncereal crops reflects increased allocation of sown area to 
noncereal crops following a relaxation of the emphasis on cereal 
production and an increase in hhe relative price of noncereal as 
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compared with cereal crops, much of the growth is accounted for by 
increased yields. Cereal sown area:has fallen by more than six million 
hectares, not only because of increased area sown to economic crops 
but an even larger reduction in the multiple grain cropping that had 
been undertaken in the first half of the·1970s when pressure was brought 
to bear to increase grain output without adequate consideration for costs. 
Despite these losses in grain sown area,output rose 15 percent between 
1977 and 1981, since yields rose more than 20 percent. 
A large portion of the growth of yields and output can be explained 
by the reemergence of more rational cropping patterns. State guarantees 
of adequate cereal supplies to sugar producers, undertaken as early as 
1977 in Fukien, were extended to the other major producing regions, 
Kwangtung and Kwangsi in 1980 and 1981, respectively. The increase in 
yields, output, and shipments of refined sugar outcf comparative 
advantage regions has so reduced production of cane in noncomparative 
advantage regions that even as output has risen 70 percent, total national sown 
area has shrunk by almost 15 percent. 
Reemergence of specialized cotton production in northwest Shantung 
28is another success story. In the 1950s four prefectures in the north-
west portion of the province continued their historic specialization in 
cotton production. In 1956 and 1957 their sown area was 590,000 and 
530,000 hectares, 80 percent of the provincial total. At the trough of 
production in the 1970s,in response to the attempt to become self­
sufficient in grain, cotton sown area dropped to as low as 250,000 
hectares and most of the counties in the area fell into poverty. In 
1977-79 the greatest concentration of rural poverty in terms of both 
-19-
numbers of counties and of people was in the North China Plain and a 
large number of these were in areas of historic cotton specialization. 
Almost all of the chronic poverty in Shantung was in the cotton­
growing regions of the northwest. 
The success of the reemergence of specialization is reflected 
in a quadrupling of provincial cotton output between 1978 and 1981 and 
the reemergence of Shantung as a major cotton exporter. By 1981 exports 
were almost 60 percent of output--ahead of the 40 percent share shipped 
29 
out during the 1950s. More significantly by 1980 sown area in the 
nowthwest part of the province had recovered to the level of the 1950s 
and twenty of the twenty-two counties, with a total population in 
excess of twenty million, had escaped the poverty level with incomes 
rising from one-third below the national average in 1978 to 10 percent 
above the national average in 1980. 
Much of the growth in yields and output since 1978 can be accounted 
for by the reemergence of specialized production, as in central coastal 
Fukien and northwest Shantung, the renewal of marketing opportunities, 
and the sale of adequate supplies of food crops to peasants producing 
economic crops. 
Although the new policies seem initially successful in terms of 
their positive stimulus to output, efficiency,and farm income,it is not 
clear that they will be sustained. Already there is evidence that the 
Party is retreating from the policies embraced so eagerly in 1978 
and especially 1979. Promised reductions in the prices of major 
agricultural producer goods have not been forthcoming; promised 
increases in state 
, 
funds for agricultural investment have fallen victim 
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to the general budgetary retrenchment of the past few years; rural 
markets, that have contributed so much to the revival of the farm economy, 
have come under increased state regulation and price controls; even 
the higher prices the state has paid since 1979 for farm products,are 
under pressure. Perhaps most surprising, in the spring of 1982 the 
government froze the existing levels of interprovincial cereal transfers 
30for a three-year period. 
The root cause of all of these signs of retreat is the Party's 
continued commitment to insulate urban consumers from higher farm level prices 
and an unwillingness to reduce further the rate of investment. The policy of 
providing staple foods at fixed prices to the urban population is not new. 
It began in 1952 but since the mark-up between state purchase prices 
for unprocessed grain in the countryside and the resale of wheat flour 
and polished rice at ration prices in cities was between 
100 and 150 percent, these transactions were highly 
31profitable. Even after absorbing processing losses, transport costs, 
and marketing costs, profits, which were channeled to the state 
form were about one h~lf hillinn 
yuan per year. By the mid-1970s, however, losses had become significant 
since farm-level prices had been raised considerably in the first half 
of the 1960s and retail price adjustments were quite modest--three to 
seven perceat for major cereals. Between 1974 and 1978 losses on the 
purchase and resale of cereals and vegetable oils cumulated to 20.8 
billion yuan. 
Losses mounted rapidly after 1978 because retail prices remained 
fixed while prdcurement prices rose sharply. Losses on cereals 
-21-
and edible vegetable oils are now .2 yuan and .8 yuan per kilogram 
meaning that the ration price of cereal covers only 60 percent of the 
cost of procurement and marketing and an even lower share of the costs 
32of edible vegetable oils. By 1981 total subsidies, almost all of 
which accrued to the urban population and the small number of state 
employees in rural areas,were about 25 billion yuan. That is the 
equivalent of fully one-quarter of state budgetary revenues (combining 
all levels of government), more than six percent of national income 
(based on the Chinese national income concept), or 30 percent of the 
wage bill of state workers and employees. 
These subsidies dwarf those for the Food Corporation of India which 
manages India's Fair Price Shap System with losses well under one percent 
of national income. More significant, Chinese subsidies far surpass 
those prevailing in other centrally planned systems. In the most 
notorious case, Poland, food subsidies soared in the 1970s and by 1980 
were 18 percent of the wage fund, only about two-thirds the Chinese 
level. 
The financial burden of £bod subsidies on the state by 1981 had 
grown so large that it became clear that the state could no longer 
simultaneously maintain an investment rate of thirty percent or more; 
provide basic food commodities to urban consumers that in nominal terms 
were only about five percent above the levels of 1952 and in real terms 
had fallen for three decades, and sustain the higher prices offered 
to peasants. 
Most of the measures taken since 1980 suggest that the adjustment 
to this financial burden is being borne by the peasantry. Ch'mYun, 
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the chief architect of the reforms instituted. since the end of the 
Cultural Revolution and an ardent supporter of a:>re favorable price 
and marketing incentives for peasants,has ruled out upward adjustment 
of urban retail prices for staple foods, recognizing that this could cause urban 
chaos. 
33 
Although state investment has declined from its peak of 37 percent in 
1978 to 28 percent in 1981, it appears to have remained stable 
since then. Moreover, the newly announced plan to quadruple 
agricultural and industrial output by the year 2000 has created a new 
impetus for high investment rates. On the other hand, no less an 
authority than Hu Yaobang, the Chairman of the Party, has stated that 
future growth of farm income must be derived from increased output 
34
and productivity growth, rather than higher prices. Since 1981 in 
particular the state has made a concentrated effort to reduce average 
farm prices, not by reducing posted prices but by reducing the share 
of output purchased at higher above-quota and negotiated prices, 
that have been of increased importance since 1979. Ironically the 
state's curtailment of some rural marketing opportunities, primar:Lly 
to reduce the main competitor to deliveries to the state, and its 
curtailment of long.distance trade in cereal cropi... substantially 
reduces the prospects for peasants achieving income gains through 
productivity growth. 
, One is left with the impression that the modification since 1978 
of the historic emphasis on urban and industrial development has 
been modest. Preservation of retail price stability for staple foods 
consumed by the urban population has been revealed as more important 
than providing incentive prices to producers. In some societies such 
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a choice might be justified on equity grounds since the absolute level 
of in~ome of the urban poor is low and they frequently suffer sharp 
declines in their real income and consumption when food prices rose. 
Such an argument does not appear persuasive in China. As already 
pointed out, rationing of subsidized foods is not targeted on the 
urban poor but is universal for nonagricultural households. Second, 
according to official data the urban poor are extremely small in 
. 35 Th inumber, about 2 percent of t he urban popu1ation. at s 
hardly surprising since for two or more decades rural-urban migration 
has been strictly controlled by t1ie·Ministry of Public Security and 
secure urban employment has been the IIDSt important prerequisite 
for approval to change place of residence. Third, not only is rural 
poverty more pervasive than urban poverty, the living standards of 
the rural poor are probably lower than their urban counterparts. Thus 
it is likely that China's system of producer levies and urban rationing 
worsens rather than improves the distribution of income. Production 
incentives and equity would be jointly improved by imposing fewer 
constraints on farm level prices and providing subsidized food only 
to the small share of the urban population that falls below the existing 
urban poverty standard. 
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